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Case No. 20091033-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.
MAURICIO SOSA,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant, Mauricio Sosa, appeals from convictions for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West Supp. 2008), possession of a firearm by a
restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10503(3) (a) (West 2004), and possession of marijuana in a drug-free zone, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp.
2008). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e)
(West 2009).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the magistrate fail to comply with the retention requirements of
rule 40, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by allowing the affiant officer to
walk the search warrant documents to the court clerk for filing, and if so, is
exclusion of the evidence required?
Standard of Review. The ultimate question of whether the trial court
complied with rule 40's retention requirement is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness. Cf State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, If 9, 22 P.3d 1242 (holding that
ultimate question of whether trial court complied with rule 11 requirements "is
a question of law, reviewed for correctness"). The question of what remedy to
apply when a magistrate fails to comply with rule 40's retention requirements is
also a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Cf. Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt,
Inc., 2009 UT 49, f 19,221 P.3d 205 (holding that "the question of what standard
applies to determine an abuse of privilege presents a question of law, which we
review for correctness").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
The following provisions are reproduced in Addendum A: Utah R. Crim.
P. 30; Utah R. Crim. P. 40.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
On August 11, 2008, a police officer met with Judge Mark Kouris in his
chambers on the third floor of the West Jordan courthouse and presented a
sworn affidavit in support of a warrant to search Sosa's home. R.5; R.107:2-3.
Acting as magistrate, Judge Kouris signed the warrant and returned it and the
supporting affidavit to the officer. R.107:3. The officer then walked the search
warrant documents to the clerk's office on the first floor. R.107:3-4,15. This took
the officer no more than five minutes, and he never left the building.
R.107:4,15.2 The clerk recorded issuance of the warrant, made and retained
copies for filing, and returned the originals to the officer. See R.107:3-4. Three
days later, officers executed the warrant and seized cocaine, ecstasy,
paraphernalia, and numerous firearms from Sosa's home. See R.5.

1

The facts surrounding issuance of the challenged search warrant are
based on the stipulation of defense counsel at the August 4, 2009 hearing. See
R.107 (Addendum B). The location of the magistrate's chambers and the clerk's
office is not in the record, but is stated in Defendant's brief. See Aplt. Brf. at 4
n.l. The State agrees that the Court may take judicial notice of these facts.
2

Sosa asserts that after Judge Kouris signed the warrant, the officer had
the search warrant documents "for an unknown period of time (less than one
day, possibly as short as 5 minutes). Aplt. Brf. at 4. However, at the August 4,
2009 hearing, defense counsel stipulated that the officer had the documents for
"whatever time it would have taken the officer to go from [the magistrate's]
office down to the warrants clerk's office." R.107. Judge Kouris, who was also
the trial judge in this case, found that "the time frame to get from [his] chambers
down to file it is probably five minutes or l e s s , . . . based on [his] experience of
actually making that walk before." R.15. Sosa has not challenged that finding.
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Sosa was thereafter charged by Information with two counts of possession
of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone with intent to distribute, possession
of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, and possession of a firearm by a
restricted person. R.1-5. Sosa moved to suppress the evidence on the ground
that the magistrate failed to retain the search warrant documents as required
under rule 40, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R.62-65,107. Following a
hearing on the matter, the district court denied the motion. R.71-72; R.107. The
court ruled that the magistrate complied with the retention requirements of rule
40 because the officer was "acting as [the magistrate's] agent to carry [the
documents] down and actually having [them] filed instead of [the magistrate]
walking down and having [them] filed/' R.107:15-16.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sosa pled guilty to possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, possession of a firearm by a
restricted person, a third degree felony, and possession of marijuana in a drugfree zone, a class A misdemeanor. R.75-76,79-92. In pleading, Sosa reserved his
right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. R.86. The
court later sentenced Sosa to the maximum terms of confinement on each
offense, suspended those sentences, and placed Sosa on supervised probation
for 36 months. R.95-97. Sosa timely appealed. R.102.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
After the magistrate signed the subject search warrant, the affiant officer
walked the search warrant documents to the clerk's office. The clerk recorded
issuance of the warrant, made and retained copies of the search warrant
documents for filing with the court, and returned the originals to the officer.
Because the officer was acting as the magistrate's agent in walking the
documents to the clerk for filing, the magistrate satisfied rule 40, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, requiring that he retain a copy of the search warrant
documents "[a]t the time of issuance." Utah R. Crim. P. 40(i)(l).
Even assuming, arguendo, that the magistrate violated rule 40's retention
requirement by allowing the officer to walk the documents to the clerk, any
error was harmless. Contrary to the court of appeals decision in State v.
Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73,206 P.3d 640, cert, granted, 215 P.3d 161 (Utah 2009),
this Court's decision in Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79,149 P.3d 352, does not
require exclusion of evidence for a magistrate's failure to comply with rule 40's
retention requirement. As explained by this Court in State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d
1258 (Utah 1983), a magistrate's violation of a required warrant procedure is
subject to harmless error analysis under rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Sosa has not alleged, much less shown, that the magistrate's error
adversely affected his substantial rights.
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ARGUMENT
THE MAGISTRATE COMPLIED WITH RULE 40's RETENTION
REQUIREMENT, BUT EVEN IF HE DID NOT, ANY ERROR
WAS HARMLESS
Sosa argues that by allowing the affiant officer to deliver the search
warrant documents to the clerk for filing, the magistrate failed to strictly comply
with rule 40's requirement that the magistrate retain those documents at the
time they are issued. See Aplt. Brf. at 6-9. He argues that this alleged error
requires suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. Aplt.
Brf. at 9-11. Sosa's argument lacks merit.
A. The magistrate complied with rule 40's retention requirement.
Rule 40 requires issuing magistrates to retain a copy of the search warrant
documents at the time the warrant is issued:
At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a
copy of the search warrant, the application and all affidavits or
other recorded testimony on which the warrant is based and shall,
within a reasonable time, file those sealed documents in court files
which are secured against access by the public. . . .
Utah R. Crim. P. 40(f)(1). As ruled by the district court, rule 40's retention
requirement was satisfied in this case because the officer was " acting as [the
magistrate's] agent to carry [the documents] down and actually having [them]
filed instead of [the magistrate] walking down and having [them] filed/'
R.107:15-16.
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Sosa asserts that" [l]aw enforcement cannot do the magistrate's job under
rule 40." Aplt. Brf. at 7. But nothing in the law prohibits a magistrate from
allowing an officer to perform certain ministerial acts on his or her behalf. Cf.
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-218 (West 2009) (providing that a judicial officer has
the power "to compel obedience to his lawful orders as provided by law").
When a probation officer gathers information for the court in connection with a
presentence investigation report, the officer "acts as an agent of the court,"
rather than a law enforcement agent. United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 979
(10th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 839 (1990); accord United States v. Berger, 976
F.Supp 947, 949 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Likewise, when, under the direction of the
magistrate, an officer delivers search warrant documents to the court clerk for
filing, he is acting as the magistrate's agent.
Because the officer in this case was acting as the magistrate's agent, the
magistrate complied with rule 40's requirement that he "retain" a copy of the
search warrant documents. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40(i)(l). This Court should
therefore affirm the district court's ruling denying Sosa's motion to suppress.
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B.

Exclusion of the evidence is not warranted in any event, because
the alleged error was harmless.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the magistrate did not comply with rule

40's retention requirement when it allowed the officer to file the documents on
• his behalf, exclusion of the evidence is not warranted.
la Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79, f 26,206 P.3d 640, this Court "call[ed]
upon [its] supervisory power over the courts of this state to require that they
retain copies of all warrants issued and the documents supporting the requests
for such warrants/' Contrary to the holding of the court of appeals in State v.
Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73,1117-18, 206 P.3d 640, cert granted, 215 R3d 161
(Utah 2009), Anderson did not require exclusion of evidence for a violation of the
retention requirement. The Court was silent on the issue of exclusion and "le[ft]
to [its] rule-making process the particular mechanisms for implementing this
requirement and managing these records/' Id.
Less than five months after Anderson issued, subsection (i)(l) was "added
[to rule 40] in compliance with the order . . . in Anderson/' Utah R. Crim. P. 40,
Advisory Committee Notes (i).3 Although rule 40(i) could have compelled
exclusion of the evidence for a violation of its retention requirement, it was

3

Subsection (i)(2), which identifies the methods by which search warrant
documents may be sealed and retained, "supercedes the supervisory orders of
the Court in Anderson v. Taylor for that purpose/' Utah R. Crim. P. 40, Advisory
Committee Notes (i).
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silent on the issue of remedy. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40. Indeed, no provision in
rule 40 addresses the remedy for a violation of the rule. Therefore, as is the case
for violations of other rules of criminal procedure, violations of rule 40 are
governed by rule 30: "Any e r r o r . . . shall be disregarded" unless it "affect[s] the
substantial rights of a party." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). In other words, a violation
of rule 40 does not require suppression if the error is harmless See State v.
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989).
This Court has long applied rule 30's harmless error standard to cases
involving a magistrate's failure to comply with a required warrant procedure
that does not rise to the level of constitutional error. 4 In State v. Anderton, 668
P.2d 1258,1262 (Utah 1983), the magistrate "failfed] to return the search warrant
and the related documents to the appropriate court within fifteen days after the
execution of the warrant," as required by statute. Relying on rule 30, the Court
refused to exclude the evidence because the defendant had not shown that the

4

Sosa has not claimed that a magistrate's failure to retain search warrant
documents is a constitutional violation, see Aplt. Brf. at 6-11, and for good
reason. As recently reemphasized by the United States Supreme Court, the
reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment "has never
'depend[ed] on the law of the particular State in which the search occurs/"
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164,172 (2008) (quoting California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35,43 (1988)). Instead, the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment
are limited to those set forth in the plain language of its text. See United States v.
Grubbs, 54J U.S. 90, 97 (2006) ("rejecting efforts to expand the scope of [the
Fourth Amendment] to embrace unenumerated matters").

-9-

magistrate's failure to comply with the warrant procedure "had any adverse
effect on [the defendants'] substantial rights/' Anderton, 668 P.2d at 1261-62.
The burden of showing harm or prejudice for non-constitutional error
rests with the defendant. See State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, \ 94, 63 P.3d 731
(holding that" [t]he burden of showing [harm] rests on the complaining party").
Accordingly, exclusion is appropriate only if defendant can establish that "the
error is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable
likelihood that in its absence there would have been a more favorable result for
the defendant." State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071,1073 (Utah 1989). On the other
hand, exclusion is not appropriate if the error is "sufficiently inconsequential
that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the
proceedings." State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, | 20,20 P.3d 888. Such is the case here.
Sosa has not challenged the validity of the search warrant itself. He has
not claimed that the warrant lacked probable cause, that it was not supported by
oath or affirmation, or that it did not otherwise meet the particularity
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See Aplt. Brf. at 6-13. Nor has Sosa
alleged that the officer in this case altered the search warrant documents. See
R.107:7-8 (defense counsel stating, "I am not insinuating that the officer did
anything inappropriate in this case"); Aplt. Brf. at 6-11. Thus, as in Anderton,
Sosa "ha[s] made no showing that the magistrate's [alleged] failure to comply
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with [rule 40 , s retention requirement] had any adverse affect upon his
substantial rights, nor ha[s] [he] shown that such failure in any way
compromised the integrity of the documents/ 7 Anderton, 668 P.2d at 1262.
In sum, the magistrate's alleged rule violation "constituted nothing more
than the failure to perform a ministerial act which did not affect the validity of
the search warrant and the search conducted thereunder/' Id. This Court is
thus "obliged to disregard the [error] . . . by reason of the content of Rule 30,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." See id. at 1261-62.
Anderton's harmless error analysis is not unlike the approach taken by the
federal courts in addressing violations of rule 40's federal counterpart—Fed. R.
Crim. P. 41. The federal circuits have uniformly held that "suppression of
evidence is not the proper remedy" for nonconstitutional violations of its
warrant rule unless the defendant can "demonstrate] . . . prejudice or bad
faith." United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 270 (4th Cir. 2000); accord United
States v. Antrim, 389 F.3d 276,282 (1st Cir. 2004), cert, denied, 544 U.S. 936 (2005);
United States v. Nichols, 344 F.3d 793, 799 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Omar,
137 F.3d 359,362 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081,1087
(10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Martinez-Zayas, 857 F.2d 122,136 (3rd Cir. 1988),
overruled in part on other grounds in United States v. Cltapple, 985 F.2d 729 (3rd
Cir. 1993); United States v. Stockheimer, 807 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1986), cert
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denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987); United States v. Loyd, 721 F.2d 331, 333 (11th O r .
1983) (per curiam); United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436,441 (5th O r . 1981); United
States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d 1231,1235 (9th O r . 1981) (citation omitted); United
States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2nd Cir. 1975).
Sosa argues, however, that Dominguez's

decision "to apply the

exclusionary rule strictly in the context of Rule 40" is necessary to eliminate all
possibility of mishandling or alteration of search warrant documents. Aplt. Brf.
at 9-10. For example, Sosa contends that under the circumstances of this case, an
officer could create an affidavit "with accurate, but unconvincing facts," and an
affidavit with "embellished facts"; present the false affidavit to the magistrate;
and after the magistrate signs the warrant, "switch out the embellished
[affidavit] with the factually accurate (but weaker) [affidavit] and attach the
signed warrant page before depositing the documents with [the] clerk's office a
few minutes later." Aplt. Brf. at 10. Such a scenario "'is far too speculative,
[and] far too remote a possibility to justify the application'" of the exclusionary
rule. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 522 (1988)(citation
omitted).
As explained in Franks v. Delaware, "[t]here is a presumption of validity
with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant." Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154,171 (1978). Where a defendant believes the affidavit includes false
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statements (or has been tampered with), he or she can seek an appropriate
hearing as provided under Franks. See id. at 171-72. Otherwise, this Court
should reject" [indiscriminate application" of the exclusionary remedy, United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984), adhering instead to the time-tested
harmless error standard of rule 30.
* **

In sum, Cone invites the Court to "'let the criminal go free/ not because of
any intentional violation of law by the constable, but simply because the
[magistrate] has 'blundered/" United States v. Comstock, 805 F.2d 1194,1210 (5th
Cir. 1986) (citation omitted), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987). The Court should
decline the invitation. The exclusionary rule is "a blunt instrument, conferring
an altogether disproportionate reward not so much in the interest of the
defendant as in that of society at large." Burke, 517 F.2d at 386 (quotation and
citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court should "be wary in extending the
exclusionary rule . . . to violations which are not of constitutional magnitude,"
especially those that involve no police misconduct. Id. Evidence should not be
excluded where, as here, there is "no constitutional violation, nor any
prejudice." Comstock, 805 F.3d at 1210.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the decision of the
district court below. In doing so, the State respectfully asks the Court to hold
that (1) rule 40's retention requirement does not preclude an officer from filing
the search warrant documents with the clerk at the magistrate's behest; and (2) a
violation of the retention requirement does not result in the exclusion of
evidence where the error is harmless.
Respectfully submitted July 21, 2010.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

JEFFREY S. GRAY

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addenda

ADDENDUM A

Rules 30 & 40, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

Rule 30. Errors and Defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the
court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order.
Rule 40. Search Warrants.
(a) Definitions.
As used in this rule:
(a)(1) "Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m. and ending at 10 p.m.
local time.
(a)(2) "Recorded" or "recording" includes the original recording of testimony,
a return or other communication or any copy, printout, facsimile, or other
replication that is intended by the person making the recording to have the same
effect as the original.
(a)(3) "Search warrant" is an order issued by a magistrate in the name of the
state and directed to a peace officer, describing with particularity the thing, place,
or person to be searched and the property or evidence to be seized and includes an
original written or recorded warrant or any copy, printout, facsimile or other
replica intended by the magistrate issuing the warrant to have the same effect as
the original.
(b) Grounds for issuance.
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search warrant if there is
probable cause to believe it:
(b)(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(b)(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being used to commit or
conceal the commission of an offense; or
(b)(3) is evidence of illegal conduct.
(c) Conditions precedent to issuance.
(c)(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and shall particularly describe the person or place to be
searched and the person, property, or evidence to be seized.
(c)(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in
the possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause
shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to the

alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by the
magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by subpoena,
or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if
sought by subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant issued, the
magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such conditions that reasonably afford
protection of the following interests of the person or entity in possession of such
evidence:
(c)(2)(A) protection against unreasonable interference with normal business;
(c)(2)(B) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential
sources of information; or
(c)(2)(C) protection against prior or direct restraints on constitutionally
protected rights.
(d) Search warrant served in readable form.
A copy of a search warrant shall be served in a readable form upon the person
or place to be searched.
(e) Time for service—Officer may request assistance.
(e)(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that it be served in
the daytime, unless the affidavit or recorded testimony states sufficient grounds to
believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to its being
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason; in which case
the magistrate may insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or night.
(e)(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of
issuance. Any search warrant not executed within this time shall be void and shall
be returned to the court or magistrate as not executed.
(e)(3) An officer may request other persons to assist in conducting the search.
(f) Receipt for property taken.
The officer, when seizing property pursuant to a search warrant, shall give a
receipt to the person from whom it was seized or in whose possession it was
found. If no person is present, the officer shall leave the receipt in the place where
the property was found.
(g) Return—Inventojy of property taken.
The officer, after execution of the warrant, shall promptly make a signed return
of the warrant to a magistrate of the issuing court and deliver a written or recorded
inventory of anything seized, stating the place where it is being held.
(h) Safekeeping of property.
The officer seizing the property shall be responsible for its safekeeping and
maintenance until the court otherwise orders.

(i) Magistrate to retain and file copies—Documents sealed for twenty daysForwarding of record to court with jurisdiction.
(i)(l) At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the
search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded testimony on
which the warrant is based and shall, within a reasonable time, file those sealed
documents in court files which are secured against access by the public. Those
documents shall remain sealed until twenty days following the issuance of the
warrant unless that time is extended or reduced under Section (m). Unsealed
search warrant documents shall be filed in the court record available to the public.
(i)(2) Sealing and retention of the file may be accomplished by:
(i)(2)(A) placing paper documents or storage media in a sealed envelope and
filing the sealed envelope in a court file not available to the public;
(i)(2)(B) storing the documents by electronic or other means under the control
of the court in a manner reasonably designed to preserve the integrity of the
documents and protect them against disclosure to the public during the period in
which they are sealed; or
(i)(2)(C) filing through the use of an electronic filing system operated by the
State of Utah which system is designed to transmit accurate copies of the
documents to the court file without allowing alteration to the documents after
issuance of the warrant by the magistrate.
(j) Findings required for service without notice.
If the magistrate finds upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may
be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to
any person if notice were given, the magistrate may direct that the officer need not
give notice of authority and purpose before entering the premises to be searched.
(k) Violation of health, safety, building, or animal cruelty laws or ordinancesWarrant to obtain evidence.
In addition to other warrants provided by this rule, a magistrate, upon a
showing of probable cause to believe a state, county, or city law or ordinance, has
been violated in relation to health, safety, building, or animal cruelty, may issue a
warrant for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a violation. A warrant may be
obtained from a magistrate upon request of a peace officer or state, county, or
municipal health, fire, building, or animal control official only after approval by a
prosecuting attorney. A search warrant issued under this section shall be directed
to any peace officer within the county where the warrant is to be executed, who
shall serve the warrant. Other concerned personnel may accompany the officer.

(I) Remotely communicated search warrants.
(/)(1) Means of communication. When reasonable under the circumstances, a
search warrant may be issued upon sworn or affirmed testimony of a person who
is not in the physical presence of the magistrate, provided the magistrate is
satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. All
communication between the magistrate and the peace officer or prosecuting
attorney requesting the warrant may be remotely transmitted by voice, image, text,
or any combination of those, or by other means.
(/)(2) Communication to be recorded. All testimony upon which the magistrate
relies for a finding of probable cause shall be on oath or affirmation. The
testimony and content of the warrant shall be recorded. Recording shall be by
writing or by mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by other
means.
(/)(3) Issuance. If the magistrate finds that probable cause is shown, the
magistrate shall issue a search warrant.
(/)(4) Signing warrant. Upon approval, the magistrate may direct the peace
officer or the prosecuting attorney requesting a warrant from a remote location to
sign the magistrate's name on a warrant at a remote location.
(/)(5) Filing of warrant and testimony. The warrant and recorded testimony
shall be retained by and filed with the court pursuant to Section (i). Filing may be
by writing or by mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by
other means.
(/)(6) Usable copies made available. Except as provided in Sections (i) and (m)
of this rule, any person having standing may request and shall be provided with a
copy of the warrant and a copy of the recorded testimony submitted in support of
the application for the warrant. The copies shall be provided in a reasonably usable
form.
(m) Sealing and Unsealing of Search Warrant Documents.
(m)(l) Application for sealing of documents related to search warrants. A
prosecutor or peace officer may make a written or otherwise recorded application
to the court to have documents or records related to search warrants sealed for a
time in addition to the sealing required by Subsection (i)(l). Upon a showing of
good cause, the court may order the following documents to be sealed:
(m)(l)(A) applications for search warrants;
(m)(l)(B) search warrants;
(m)(l)(C) affidavits or other recorded testimony upon which the search warrant
is based;

(m)(l)(D) the application, affidavits or other recorded testimony and order for
sealing the documents.
(m)(2) Sealing of search warrant documents. Search warrant documents are
public record that may be sealed in entirety or in part and not placed in the public
file if all or part of the information in them would:
(m)(2)(A) cause a substantial risk of harm to a person's safety;
(m)(2)(B) pose a clearly unwarranted invasion of or harm to a person's
reputation or privacy; or
(m)(2)(C) pose a serious impediment to the investigation.
Sealed documents shall be maintained in a file not available to the public. If a
document is not sealed in its entirety, the court may order a copy of the document
with the sealed portions redacted to be placed in the public file and an un-redacted
copy to be placed in the sealed file. Except as required by Section (i), no document
may be designated as "Filed under Seal" or "Confidential" unless it is
accompanied by a court order sealing the document.
(m)(3) Unsealing of documents. Any person having standing may file a motion
to unseal search warrant documents with notice to the prosecutor and law
enforcement agency. If the prosecutor or law enforcement agency files an
appropriate and timely objection to the unsealing, the court may hold a hearing on
the motion and objection. Where no objection to unsealing the documents is filed,
the defendant may prepare an order for entry by the court. The court may order the
unsealing of the documents or order copies of the documents to be delivered to a
designated person without unsealing the documents and require the person
receiving the documents not to disclose the contents to any other person without
the authorization of the court.
(m)(4) Length of time documents may remain sealed. The documents may
remain sealed until the court finds, for good cause, that the records should be
unsealed.
[Approved effective May 2, 2005; amended effective April 30, 2007.]

Advisory Committee Notes
(a) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-201 Utah Code Ann.
(b) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-202 Utah Code Ann.
(c) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-203 Utah Code Ann.
(d) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-204 Utah Code Ann.
(e) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-205 Utah Code Ann.
(f) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-206 Utah Code Ann. The statute
contained the words "Failure to give or leave a receipt does not render the evidence seized
inadmissible at trial." This rule is not a departure from that original legislative intent. While the
committee did not consider it necessary to address admissibility in a procedural rule, the
elimination of that language does not suggest that failure to comply with the receipt requirement
should be a basis for exclusion of the evidence seized.
(g) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-207 Utah Code Ann.
(h) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-208 Utah Code Ann.
(i) Subsection (1) is added in compliance with the order of the Utah Supreme Court in
Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79. Subsection (2) is added to allow for a planned electronic search
warrant system operated by the Utah Bureau Of Criminal Identification, or other systems which
might be employed by a magistrate. This provision supercedes the supervisory orders of the Court
in Anderson v. Taylor for that purpose.
(j) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-210(2) Utah Code Ann.
(k) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-211 Utah Code Ann.
(1) This section was formerly Rule 40 Remotely Communicated Search Warrants. Terms used
are intended to be interpreted liberally in order to facilitate remote communications as a means of
applying for and issuing search warrants while at the same time preserving the integrity of the
probable cause application and the terms of warrants that are authorized.
(m) (New section)
Cross References
Remotely communicated search warrant issued under this rule, see § 77-23-204.
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2
3
4

THE COURT: Let's call the Sosa case, then.

MR. HILL: Yes.

6

THE COURT:

He is. All right.

7

of the State of Utah vs. Mr. Mauricio —

8

right, sir?

10

Let's call the case
am I pronouncing that

MR. SOSA: Yes.
THE COURT: Mauricio Sosa.

Good afternoon, Mr. Sosa.

11

The case is 08142177.

12

briefs that have been submitted, as well as the cases.

13

I've had an opportunity to read all the

The first thing I need to ask you, Mr. Nakamura, just

14

so I understand exactly what facts we're dealing with because I

15

think Mr. Hill —

16

are stipulated here.

17

officer comes -- I don't know if this is —

18

warrant, by the way?

actually both of you, because I think the facts
If I understand the facts you're saying, an

19

MR. NAKAMURA:

20

THE COURT:

21

—

is Mr. Hill here?

5

9

We have

did I sign this

You did, Judge.

Okay.

So this is good reflection on me.

Thank you.

22

MR. NAKAMURA:

23

THE COURT:

I was trying to keep that —

I appreciate that.

I signed the warrant.

So the officer came into

24

my chambers.

He then took the warrant

25

from my office, went downstairs and filed it with the clerk?
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MR. NAKAMURA:

2

involved than that.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. NAKAMURA:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. NAKAMURA:

7

Well, I think it's a little bit more

Okay.
He came into your chambers.

Okay.
Presented you with the proposed warrant,

along with the affidavit and any supporting documents.

8

THE COURT:

Okay.

9

MR. NAKAMURA:

The Court did what it deemed was

10

appropriate at that point, which I believe was to sign the

11

warrant.

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

13

MR. NAKAMURA:

14

and all supporting documents —

15

the officer came into the chambers with --

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. NAKAMURA:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. NAKAMURA:

20

basically, all the documents that

To the officer.
—

back to the officer.

Okay.
The officer then exited chambers, went

downstairs and then went to the warrants clerk, I assume --

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. NAKAMURA:

23

Then returned the warrant, the affidavit

And signed off on that.
-- who then takes that whole bulk of

documents --

24

THE COURT:

Okay.

25

MR. NAKAMURA:

—

records it m , gives back to the
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officer those copies or originals that the officer .is supposed

2

to have, retains the.se copies or originals that the Court :.s

3

supposed to have.

4
5

THE COURT:

Got you.

So we're clear, then r there s no

allegation the officer left the building?

6

MR. NAKAMURA:

7

THE COURT:

No.

There's —

and the amount of time roughly

8

from the third floor of my office down to the first floor was

9

probably within the range of maybe 10 to 15 minutes?

10

MR. NAKAMURA:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. NAKAMURA:

Yeah, and that -- exactly, Judge.

If that?
That's correct.

I mean whatever time it

13

would have taken the officer to go from your office down to the

14

warrants clerk's office is the only time.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. NAKAMURA:

Sure.

Okay.

I think the issue that we're raising in

17

that regard, though, Judge, is the same concern that was raised

18

in Anderson -- the second concern raised in Anderson, that the

19

Dominguez case was ultimately based upon.

20

Dominguez case, it obviously goes to Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of

21

Criminal Procedure.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. NAKAMURA:

24
25

Right.
The general issue is what does that rule

really mean.
THE COURT:

When you look at the

Uh-huh.
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MR. NAKAMURA:

We now know from the Dominguez case that

2

what the rule means is that it places certain responsibilities

3

upon the magistrate.

4

they state, "We conclude that Rule 40(i) of the Utah Rules of

5

Criminal Procedure requires the magistrate" —

6

u

7

documents.

8

retain this information and subsequently supply it to the Court,"

9

which is exactly what happened here.

italicized —

to make and keep a copy of the search warrant and supporting

10
11

In fact, on paragraph 11 in the opinion,

It is not sufficient for the peace officer alone to

THE COURT:

Okay.

So we're clear —

crystal clear, in

the Dominguez case it was a telephonic warrant, correct?

12

MR. NAKAMURA:

Right.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. NAKAMURA:

15

THE COURT: So the next morning in this case, not only

It was unrecorded, correct?
Right.

16

did the magistrate not have a copy of -- well, the magistrate had

17

absolutely no copy of what happened the night before; is that

18

correct?

19

MR. NAKAMURA:

That's correct.

20

THE COURT: And how many hours elapsed between the time

21

the magistrate issued the warrant and the warrant was presented

22

to the Court?

23

MR. NAKAMURA:

A number of hours, but I would suggest

24

that when you look at the Dominguez case, the facts of this

25

Dominguez case, and indeed the facts of the Anderson case are not

-6the material information necessarily relied upon by the Court to
come to its ruling, but rather an interpretation of the rule.

I

guess that's what I would respond to.
In the State's memorandum, they're saying, "Wait,
the facts are distinguishable."

Well, they are indeed

distinguishable, but they are still facts that do not comply with
the rule.

When you look at Anderson and now the Dominguez case,

those facts are different.

Anderson is different from Dominguez,

Dominguez is different from Anderson.
Indeed the federal cases that they looked to in deciding
the Dominguez case are slightly different as well factually, but
the rule is the same.

Thus, we then come down to the issue of,

"Well, how strictly shall we interpret Rule 40?"
The Dominguez case answers that, too.

They indicate,

"Well, this is a question of first impression: for us."

They say

in paragraph 17, "Because this is an issue of first impression,
we are left to decide for the first time how strictly Rule 40
should be enforced in Utah."

They go on to state that it shall

be strictly enforced.
Essentially in -- and they state that the Anderson -the Supreme Court in Anderson, their ruling there.

They say,

"We assume that the Utah Supreme Court wishes this rule to be
followed strictly now that it has been implemented."

Then as

they go on they conclude with, "Thus, Rule 4 0 is unambiguous in
setting forth the Court's responsibility when issuing search
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warrants, including those sought telephonically" —

2

facts aren't distinguishable ones.

3

But they go on to say that it is to be strictly followed.

4

voila, the

"Accordingly, we reverse."

However, there's on other issue that I think you have to

5

look at.

You have to go back to Anderson, because the Dominguez

6

case really relied upon the Supreme Court's Anderson case to come

7

to the ruling that they did in saying that Rule 4 0 must be

8

strictly followed and strictly interpreted.

9

When we look at the Anderson case, which they quote in

10

their decision, they cite two concerns that exist when the rule

11

is not strictly followed.

12

concern that could be at play here.

The second concern is exactly the

13

On paragraph -- it's in paragraph

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. NAKAMURA:

—

Paragraph 22?
Well, it's in paragraph 8 of the opinion,

16

but paragraph —

17

down it says, "Second, it allows for the possibility that

18

affidavits and other court records may be mishandled or even

19

altered without detection.

20

magistrate acts in issuing a warrant are handled by persons other

21

than court personnel prior to it being filed with the Court, the

22

Court has no basis for confidence in the accuracy, authenticity

23

or completeness of those documents."

24
25

apparently 2 of the Anderson opinion.

Halfway

When the records upon which the

What I'm suggesting, your Honor, is while I am not
insinuating that the officer did anything inappropriate in this
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case, and while I will acknowledge that the period of time that

2

the officer had all the documents alone would have been fairly

3

short, it still would have allowed for the possibility for some

4

alteration to occur in the affidavit or supporting documents.

5

If you will, the officer could come into the Court with

6

one affidavit designed to pass muster, if you will, present it to

7

the Court.

8

the warrant, gives it all back to the officer.

9

is leaving the court, another affidavit and another supporting

The Court reviews it, relies upon it, signs off on
As the officer

10

document is in there, perhaps one more accurately reflecting the

11

facts of the case.

12

That's the one that ultimately gets filed.

The concern raised here is well, then how in the

13

world if the Court doesn't retain it at that point when they're

14

reviewed and signed, how do we know -- how would the Court know

15

what documents were reviewed and relied upon?

16

what happened here.

17

That's exactly

If it were challenged, the Court would be left with,

18

''Well, what did you present?

19

said this, this, this and this, but this doesn't say this, this,

20

this and this.

21

documents ultimately all got put into the possession of the

22

officer, and there would be no way for a Court to then determine

23

whether those were the original documents that they reviewed and

24

relied upon in issuing the warrant.

25

I thought the affidavit I read

But I have no way to know."

Why?

So while I acknowledge that the facts m

Because the

this case are
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distinct from Anderson, they're clearly distinct from Dominguez.

2

The Dominguez case is not —

the ruling in the Dominguez case is

3

not really factually based.

It's really an interpretation of a

4

statute or a rule.

5

clear, and it puts clear responsibilities on Courts, and it

6

requires strict adherence to the rule.

7

wasn't followed.

8
9

That's what it's based upon.

The rule is

Under the rule, this

The very reason why the Court so ruled that it should
be strictly followed is a concern that very much exists in this

10

matter, i.e., the Court who reviews and signs no longer has

11

custody of those original documents.

12

don't care if it's for a nanosecond —

13

to then upon challenge to say, "What did I actually review?"

14

There's just no way to do it.

15

Once that occurs —

I

there's no way for a Court

When you look at the totality of the Dominguez opinion,

16

and even going to the Anderson opinion, and even the federal

17

court decisions that Court of Appeals looked to for guidance in

18

coming to this ruling, that is of a paramount concern.

19

As it states in the federal cases, they have a situation

20

whei;e if an officer or an agent calls a federal judge for a

21

search warrant telephonically it's recorded, the entirety of it.

22

It's recorded, retained by the Court.

23

about the information that the Court relied upon in issuing the

24

warrant, they've got that recorded.

25

So if there's any question

When you look at all the other decisions that they
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reviewed in coming to their opinion, that's exactly what they

2

were looking for.

3

it because even for a brief moment that officer did not retain

4

all the documents.

5

Anderson decision directly relates to.

6

In this case, we don't have it.

We don't have

That's an opportunity that point 2 in the

So we contend that the ruling of Dominguez is Rule 4 0

7

should be strictly followed, and it wasn't strictly followed

8

here.

9

THE COURT:

10
11

Okay.

MR. NAKAMURA:

So we're asking for the same relief that

was offered in Dominguez as well.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. HILL:

All right.

Mr. Hill?

Your Honor, the Dominguez case —

obviously

14

the facts —

15

vastly different than what we're dealing with here.

16

a telephonic warrant where the officer -- I mean I'm not going

17

to —

18

with a telephonic warrant where the Judge never actually had any

19

copy of the affidavits, never made any recording on it, and then

20

subsequently receives this on the return of service.

21

and I don't think it's in dispute that the facts are
I mean it's

I'm sure the Court knows the facts, but they're dealing

I think that was the main issue that Dominguez was

22

dealing with.

They say in —

paragraph 11 of the Dominguez

23

says, "We conclude that Rule 40(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal

24

Procedure requires the magistrate to make and keep a copy of the

25

search warrant and supporting documents."

Then the next
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1

sentence,

2

retain this info rmat ion and subsequently supply it to the Court. "

3

It is not sufficient for the peace officer alone to

They're spe cifically speaking to those —

that set of

4

facts.

5

the officer isn' t ta king it and then (inaudible) supplying it to

6

the Court.

7

I believe, walking it down to the clerk, where we verified in

8

this case that it was logged in, that it was —

9

and kept on file with the Court.

10

In this case I don't think we have that issue.

It's

—

He's taking it, and out of convenience for the Court,

a copy was made

I think the concerns that Anderson and Dominguez had

11

were that if this officer is allowed to retain these affidavits

12

and then subsequently bring it back and (inaudible) to the Court,

13

then this defendant has no way to go back and attack the validity

14

of the probable cause included in that affidavit that was

15

presented to the magistrate.

16

In this case I just don't think that there are those

17

same concerns.

The officer gives your Honor the affidavit.

18

It was signed.

It was filed.

19

If there's any need, or the defendant wants to come back and

20

attack the validity of that probable cause, he's able to do that.

21

There's a copy that was kept on file with the Court.

22

There's a copy of it there.

If there's another copy out there, obvi -- that the

23

officer changed or altered in any way, it's easily detected with

24

what's been on file with the Court.

25

straws to say that an officer is going to walk out of your

I think we're grasping at
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courtroom and on his way to —

2

been made, but in that brief time walking down to the clerk's

3

office he's going to add a bunch of information or attack

4

something else there.

5

in this case.

6

and I know that allegation hasn't

I just don't think it's a valid concern

The language that they use as quoting Anderson, in

7

the Dominguez there are concerns about the accuracy, authenticity

8

and completeness of the affidavits.

9

there's —

10

Again, I think in this case

there are ways to make sure that that's not the case.

We can compare what was filed and what comes back from

11

the officer in the return of service.

I just don't think that

12

intervening —

13

less than 10 minutes —

14

down and file it with the Court, that it's the exact same thing

15

that came from your Honor's hand.

you know, I would (inaudible) that it would be
I would say five or less for him to walk

16

I just don't think that the facts are similar enough in

17

this case, or the concern is similar enough in this case as they

18

were in the Anderson or the Dominguez case to apply that -- well,

19

to find the same result that the Dominguez Court found.

20

THE COURT;

21

MR. NAKAMURA:

Okay.

Thank you.

One last comment, Judge.

Here's the

22

problem.

When you look at the second point that the Anderson

23

Court makes, they are very specific the documents that they're

24

concerned about, and they talk about the affidavit and the

25

supporting documents.

They don't talk about the warrant.
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Then you say, "Well, wait a second, why are they being

2

so specific on the affidavit and the supporting documents?"

3

Because those are documents, a duplication of which nobody would

4

know, the Court included.

5

be drafted, executed without having anybody else know that there

6

are two.

7

They are documents of which that could

The State makes an issue about, "Well, there just isn't

8

enough time for any kind of opportunity for impropriety to exist.

9

It's minutes, if that." But there doesn't need to be any time,

10

because the documents that the Anderson Court was concerned about

11

are documents for which duplicates could be made and nobody would

12

be aware of those duplicates, and inserted into the original

13

documents within seconds, not minutes, if that's what was

14

desired.

15

I would concede that if we are just dealing with the

16

case language of Rule 40, the case language of this places clear

17

responsibilities on the magistrate who shall retain, the case

18

language of this rule is to be strictly interpreted, perhaps the

19

State might have some room to say, "Well, but the deviation here

20

is de minimis.

21

It's de minimis and therefore not material."

But when you then look at the Anderson opinion and

22

the concerns they raise, and how the Dominguez Court relied upon

23

the Anderson opinion to come up with their rulings of strict

24

compliance, and because the reasoning or one of the concerns in

25

Anderson is exactly the concern here, now you say, "Well, wait a
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second.

2

You can't really get around that."
The language of Dominguez is real clear; strictly

3

follow it, strictly interpret it.

4

magistrate shall do this.

5

in the Anderson case, they're clear about what that concern is.

6

They make very specific, if you will, notes about that first

7

concern, and that note is, "If it leaves the Court without any

8

record of the warrant or the materials supporting its issuance

9

until after the warrant is executed and a return is filed."

10

Rule 40 is real clear; the

If you even look at the first point

Well, what it's saying there is, "Gee, you know, all

11

that kind of time while the thing is being held, while it's being

12

held in preparation for execution, there it is that concern."

13

They were very specific about the parameters of that

14

concern.

15

parameters should be brcader on point 2, they would have said so,

16

but they weren't.

17

If they thought that well, you know, really the

What they say in point 2 is very clear.

"When the

18

records upon which the magistrate acts in issuing a warrant are

19

handled by persons other than the court personnel prior to being

20

filed with the Court" —

21

being executed, just filed with the Court —

22

basis for confidence in the accuracy, authenticity or

23

completeness of those records."

24
25

not prior to being executed, not after
"the Court has no

What I'm obviously suggesting is they were contemplating
even this situation.

Why?

Because the language is very clear.
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They were very deliberate in the words that they chose.

2

When you think about how this worked in this case, we

3

can see the application, primarily because the affidavit and the

4

supporting documents can have duplicates without anybody knowing

5

and being inserted thereafter, and then that document —

6

the one that the Court looked at, but the one that was inserted

7

between the Court's signature and the filing gets filed with the

8

warrants clerk.

9

not

When that gets detected by defense Counsel and

10

challenged, the Court now is without any record to ensure that

11

those documents filed were the same documents that it reviewed.

12

I don't think rhere's any question about that.

13

It does sound like it's a de minimis argument until you

14

carefully read the Dominguez opinion and you carefully read the

15

Anderson opinion and the concerns, and thus that's why we believe

16

it has application even to these set of facts, Judge.

17

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, given the fact that the

18

stipulation is that these documents, No. 1, never left the

19

courthouse, and No. 2, the time frame to get from my chambers

20

down to file it is probably five minutes or less, I would

21

say -- that's based on my experience of actually making that walk

22

before -- I would say that this is unquestionably a de minimis

23

argument, and I reject the premise that Mr. Nakamura is making

24

here.

25

First of all, when the officer takes those documents
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from me, they are acting as my agent to carry it down and

2

actually have it filed instead of me actually walking down and

3

having it filed.

4

the —

5

mishandled, that gives you a little bit more time frame.

6

don't think that person is going to mishandle something in five

7

minutes.

8

I would guess that they're looking at something with a much

9

larger time frame.

10

When we're splitting hairs this small, when

as the Anderson says, the possibility that they may be

Or that it might be altered without detection.

If in fact we were to ascribe the nefarious —

They

Again,

I guess

11

motivation of the officer that Mr. Nakamura is saying, saying,

12

"What I'm going to do is take some fakes in there, have the

13

gov —

14

it out as I'm walking for that five minute walk down," well, then

15

I think we'd have to take it the next step, then, and say, "Well,

16

then the Judge shouldn't be allowed to leave those things in his

17

inbox in his office for his clerk to be taking them down, because

18

there's always a chance an officer will be back in the halls, and

19

he might sneak in there and switch them out anyway."

have the Judge look at the good ones, and then substitute

20

Well, if we're going to ascribe that sort of motivations

21

to the officer, I think we've got a lot bigger problems than what

22

we're dealing with here, and I don't believe that to be the case.

23

So based upon that, then, I find that in fact this was

24

in strict reading of Rule 40.

The way this was handled was the

25

way it should have been handled, and I don't see any problem with
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it.

So I'm going to deny Mr. Nakamura's motion.

2
3

Now that having been said, Mr. Nakamura, where do we
want to go from here?

4
5

MR. NAKAMURA:

THE COURT:

7

MR. NAKAMURA:

8

MR. HILL:

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

It's

12

THE COURT:
that work for you?

14

I d o n ' t t h i n k we h a v e a t r i a l d a t e s e t .
(inaudible).
Two weeks out, is that what

Yeah, that's fine.

Okay.

How does the 17th at 8:30 look?

Does

Is the 18th better?

MR. NAKAMURA:

Well, that week I'm scheduled to be out

of town, but it's not coming together yet.

16
17

date?

we're thinking?
MR. NAKAMURA:

15

Do we h a v e a t r i a l

All right.

11

13

I think we just need a final pre-trial,

your Honor, to see where this is going.

6

10

Do we need another date?

THE COURT:
7:30 —

Are you?

Okay.

How does August 31st at

or 8:30 look?

18

MR. NAKAMURA:

19

THE COURT:

Well, August 31st at 1:30 looks grand.

That will be your time, then.

August 31 st

20

at 1:30 for another roll call.

21

either on a trial track or figure out where we're headed from

22

there.

23

MR. NAKAMURA:

24

THE COURT:

25

Mr. Xaix?

Then at that point we'll get it

Thank you.

All right.

Thank you.
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1

MR. XAIX:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. HILL:

Good afternoon, your Honor.
Good afternoon.
I'm s orry, Judge, would you like findings of

4

fact and conclusions of 1 aw?

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. HILL:

7

I'm sorry?
Would you like me to prepare findings of

fact?
,,^.. - . . ' ^ / j ^
WouldJ you
mind?

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. HILL: Sure.

10

THE COURT:

11

(Hearing concluded)

Thank you.
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